Alinto SOGo: missing rate limiting on TOTP verification (CVE-2026-127131)

An attacker who already has a victim’s password can repeatedly guess the second-factor code on affected SOGo installations. Upgrade to restore the login rate limit that protects accounts after password theft.

Public CVE record · Vendor or publisher advisory

cve.now entry. The experiment used a synthetic HTTP fixture.

Eden terminates the HTTP connection to the affected product, evaluates a declarative policy and — in tier 2 — a separately compiled native Rust module under signed module authority, before any byte reaches the application. It does not patch the affected component; the vendor's fixed release remains the durable repair.

Status: Declarative route-deny fixture comparison recorded. The fixture ran against Eden 1.103.0.

The vulnerability

The advisory describes missing rate limits for TOTP attempts on /SOGo/connect before SOGo 5.12.13. The synthetic fixture exercised a deny on its TOTP route. It recorded the HTTP refusal and did not measure rate-limit accounting.

The Eden patch

Tier 1 — declarative policy (blunt, fail-closed): deny every request under /SOGo/totp (non-slash scope), legitimate traffic included — false positives measured below.

Tier 2: the tested behavior requires state across requests or connections. This report records a declarative route deny.

Implement the remediation

Use this procedure in an isolated fixture to reproduce the scoped restriction. Follow the vendor update for the underlying exposure. See deployment prerequisites.

1. Prepare the target. Verify the loaded product and version against the advisory. Use a compatible Eden HTTP interlay and an authenticated operator with Configure permission. Use this reconstruction of the report’s scoped fixture deny.
2. Apply the declarative policy. Scope the policy to /SOGo/totp and descendants (all methods, deny). Set INTERLAY to the target interlay UUID in the authenticated Eden CLI. Run an authenticated GET /api/v1/interlays/{interlay} with X-Eden-Verbose: true. Save its complete current settings object as current-settings.json and retain the prior remediation declaration for recovery. Set IDEMPOTENCY_KEY to a fresh key for this intended mutation.

Save the declaration as remediation.json.

{
  "version": 1,
  "profile": "http-structure-v1",
  "policy": {
    "version": 1,
    "rules": [
      {
        "scope": {
          "methods": [],
          "path": "/SOGo/totp",
          "descendants": true
        },
        "require": {
          "kind": "deny"
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

jq -e --slurpfile policy remediation.json \
  '.remediation = $policy[0] | {settings: .}' current-settings.json \
  > interlay-update.json
eden api request PATCH "/api/v1/interlays/$INTERLAY" \
  --header "Idempotency-Key:$IDEMPOTENCY_KEY" \
  --body-file interlay-update.json --content-type application/json --confirm

3. Verify the serving policy. Read back the interlay.

eden api request GET "/api/v1/interlays/$INTERLAY" \
  --header 'X-Eden-Verbose:true'

Check that remediation_status.state is ready and both desired and effective SHA-256 values match the intended declaration. Replay the benign and marked requests in the recorded comparison on an isolated target. Check the recorded response and backend outcome for each probe. 4. Restore the previous policy. Coordinate the change with any other operator updating this interlay. Read current settings again and merge the saved remediation field into them. If the prior settings had no remediation field, omit it in the replacement. Send the same PATCH with a fresh idempotency key, then read back the intended state. Repeat the verification probes. Keep the affected route isolated if restoring the prior settings reopens exposure.

Vendor update. Use the advisory to select the fixed release for the installed branch. Reported fixed releases include 5.12.13. Follow the vendor’s update instructions and confirm the version actually loaded by the service.

Measured comparison (2026-11-12 UTC)

The comparison covers the baseline and the declarative route deny:

• Baseline (no remediation): benign 200, attack 200 with the primitive recorded at the fixture oracle
• Tier 1 (deny): both probes refused 403 (blunt, false positives included)

Authority lifecycle and negatives

Tier-1 window deny applied and revoked live; no tier-2 module exists for this stateful primitive.

Test scope

The recorded results apply to the simulated requests and the fixture's backend markers. Coverage of the vendor's vulnerable code path remains unverified.

Performance

The public evidence for this case does not include request-latency measurements.

Evidence and artifacts

• Public CVE record
• Vendor or publisher advisory