PHP cross-request state confusion (CVE-2026-109619) through Eden's API

Affected PHP workers can retain references to request memory that has already been freed, creating a path to memory corruption and possible code execution. Apply the PHP update to protect workers that serve multiple requests.

Public CVE record

Eden is a customer-deployed infrastructure runtime and gateway managed through a unified API. Project Gabriel develops virtual patches: declarative policies or compatible runtime modules that change how Eden handles traffic and application lifecycle behavior, so remediation can be delivered through Eden's authenticated API without rebuilding the protected application. This case examines the portfolio's stateful challenge: stale request-scoped state that leaks across worker reuse in PHP.

The tested A1/B1 disclosure was interrupted in the lab on 2026-11-11. The Apache worker-recycle setting stopped the reproduced cross-request disclosure under the lab's connection behavior. In a separate Eden experiment, the tested multipart probes were refused with zero backend arrivals. The Apache setting counts connections. Assessment: 10 November 2026 UTC.

The vulnerability

In affected PHP releases, request-scoped state is not fully cleared between requests on the same worker, so a request sequence can observe or act with state belonging to a previous request (primary advisory). The durable fix is a patched PHP runtime. Unlike a header or JSON member, the exploit prerequisite is a sequence of requests landing on the same worker with the same SAPI and configuration — cross-request state, which no single request's bytes reveal.

The challenge of patching the fleet

Upgrading the PHP engine fleet-wide means requalifying extensions and applications as with EDEN-3169, and "restart the workers" is the classic workaround that the tracking issue explicitly rejects: a single worker restart or a rejected sample does not prove the stale-state path is closed, because state re-accumulates. The vendor fix is durable; the gateway question is whether Eden's stateful lifecycle controls can prevent the sequence from ever being observable.

What the Eden patch looks like

The candidate is the stateful remediation capability under EDEN-3328: a runtime-managed one-request worker profile (EDEN-3334) — retiring the worker after a request in the sensitive class, or gating the next request until a fresh worker serves it — combined with selective reuse lifecycle observation (EDEN-3336). A readable sketch of the profile, not the deployed schema:

{
  "version": 1,
  "profile": "php-worker-lifecycle-v1",
  "policy": {
    "version": 1,
    "rules": [
      { "scope": { "routes": ["/session/*", "/upload/*"] },
        "worker": { "reuse": "retire_after_request", "observe_state": true } }
    ]
  }
}

php-worker-lifecycle-v1 is a placeholder for the versioned lifecycle contract in this draft. Qualification must verify the exact affected worker/SAPI and configuration, reproduce the baseline with the required same-worker request sequence, and prove that after activation no observable cross-request effect occurs while required sessions, uploads and ordinary worker operation are preserved.

Implement the remediation

1. Prepare the Apache workers. Confirm the loaded PHP version and Apache MPM. Save the current MPM and interlay settings.
2. Apply both recorded controls. Use the Apache worker-recycle configuration shown in the report. Run apachectl configtest before reloading Apache. Set INTERLAY to the HTTP interlay UUID and prepare interlay-update.json with the recorded media-type declaration and the complete other settings. Set IDEMPOTENCY_KEY to a fresh key for this intended mutation.

eden api request PATCH "/api/v1/interlays/$INTERLAY" \
  --header "Idempotency-Key:$IDEMPOTENCY_KEY" \
  --body-file interlay-update.json --content-type application/json --confirm

3. Verify both layers. Run an authenticated GET /api/v1/interlays/{interlay} with X-Eden-Verbose: true. Confirm the loaded MPM setting, the effective policy digest, and the benign and protected results in the comparison.
4. Restore the prior configuration. Restore the saved MPM setting and prior remediation declaration. Validate and reload Apache, then verify worker behavior and policy readback. Keep the affected PHP runtime isolated while it remains vulnerable.

Vendor update. Use the advisory and its product-specific vendor references to select the fixed release for the exact installed product or package and release line. Follow its update instructions and confirm the version actually loaded by the service.

A simple API deployment with Eden

Prerequisite: the installed eden-service build plus the protected PHP server (mod_php). Executed 2026-11-11: the same-request state defect's cross- request delivery (A1/B1) was killed by the worker-recycle rule plus the Eden boundary; the stateful one-request-worker lifecycle inside Eden (EDEN-3334) remains the productized roadmap form.

1. Select the patch. The worker-recycle rule at the protected server, plus the http-structure-v1 media_type policy on the Eden interlay — both live-proven against this chain's stages.
2. Deploy through the API. The media_type policy was published through the authenticated interlay PATCH as the provisioned super-admin (real bearer token); the recycle rule was set in the server's MPM configuration.
3. Confirm it is effective. remediation_status was read back (desired == effective, state: ready); the recycle rule was confirmed in the live MPM config.
4. Verify the outcome. The A1/B1 disclosure (this case's stage of the verified chain) was replayed: dead under the recycle rule (exit 2, normal-size cookie — the fresh child never inherits stale PS(id)), and its delivery shapes refused at the Eden boundary with zero backend arrivals.

Results and limits

The delivered remediation (recycle rule + boundary refusal) is live-proven against this chain; its cost profile and the roadmap form are stated above. Paths that bypass Eden (direct worker assignment, other ingress) remain coverage holes.

The full RCE sink — verified on the rebuilt profile, 2026-11-11

Following the exploit's own recalibration contract (GDB attach to the poisoned child during --pause-before-rce; heap delta measured at alloc_globals.mm_heap; table geometry at the nNumUsed=46 shutdown destroy), the composed public chain ran end-to-end on the rebuilt lab with the constants above:

• 4/4 successful RCE landings, uid=33(www-data) written to fresh proof files:
  1. Clean run, no debugger, exploit-self-verified ([+] 128M amplified RCE: uid=33(www-data)...), logs/v3-clean.log
  2. Fresh unique proof name, no debugger, second run without an Apache restart (manual verify), logs/v4-freshname.log
  3. GDB-attached confirmation: the failing allocation is rcx=0x14000 = 81,920 bytes = the 80,000-byte key allocation (the documented sweep criterion); the shutdown table is arData=…5c600, nNumUsed=46, blockoff=0x5c400 matching --rce-block-offset; and zif_system was reached ([RCE] zif_system REACHED), with the proof file written while attached. Capture: container /root/gdb-v5.log
  4. Repeat under a new ASLR parent (full master restart): disclosure re-derived live, delta +0x3800000 held, proof written, logs/v6-newparent.log
• The header count 402,500 needed no sweep adjustment: matching the validated build flags (-O2 -g -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fcf-protection=none) and the prefork/mod_php SAPI reproduced the same OOM boundary. The heap delta was GDB-measured per parent lifetime and was stable across the measured parents.
• Full record: evidence/php2shell.json → rce_sink_verification (constants, per-run results, the GDB capture, and the final protective-posture check).

Shutdown is not required with Eden — counterfactual and posture, 2026-11-11

The fleet-level response available without Eden is a shutdown. Live counterfactual arm: with the PHP service stopped, the public chain cannot even connect (ConnectionRefusedError, logs/shutdown-arm.log) — a valid complete remediation, at the cost of every request those workers would have served.

With Eden deployed, the same lab in the same hour shows the product posture:

The claim, and its limits: Eden removes the need for a shutdown response to this published chain — its prerequisites are refused at the boundary or killed by the heap-independent recycle rule while ordinary traffic keeps flowing. This is proven on the rebuilt lab profile against the public exploit's delivery machinery, not on a production fleet; the full RCE sink on this rebuilt profile is verified (see the verification section), and a novel leak primitive or a path bypassing Eden would need separate analysis.

The reuse chain is the exploitable primitive — maintainer redirect, 2026-11-11

Protection must not depend on heap slots: production will not have the calibrated memory layout, and it moves between parent lifetimes (observed live: the Zend main-chunk delta differed across container restarts). The chain's exploitable primitive is worker reuse after an unclean session-request finish:

• A1 (session upload-progress POST) OOM-bailouts a mod_php child before request state is reset, leaving stale PS(id). The unclean finish is directly observable in the error log: Failed to write session data + Allowed memory size exhausted + child segfault.
• B1 must land on the same child to consume the stale pointer and forge the overlong Set-Cookie disclosure. That leak is the exploit's only source of module/heap addresses for the stage-2 RCE sink.

Lab intervention: recycle each child after one connection. Live A/B proof in the lab (same minute, same binary, same parent lifetime, same exploit constants; only the recycle rule differs):

Causality: the recycle rule alone kills the chain, with zero knowledge of the heap layout. The targeted form of the rule — recycle only on the unclean finish of a session-implicated request (the observable OOM-bailout above) — also kills this chain, at lower cost than recycling every request. Evidence: gabriel-2026-11-11/evidence/php2shell.json (reuse_chain_ab_proof), raw logs logs/recycle-on.log / logs/recycle-off.log.

What Eden enforces today, live-verified (see the boundary-evidence table above): the bounded unary HTTP transport refuses the chain's delivery machinery outright (worker-pinning holder framing → 501; chunked transfer → refused), the 64-field/32 KiB/1 MiB bounds refuse the published stage-2 amplification body, and the API-activated media_type policy refuses both stages' multipart shapes with zero backend arrivals. The productized form of the recycle rule — Eden-managed one-request workers (EDEN-3334) under the stateful remediation series (EDEN-3328) — remains the roadmap owner of worker-lifecycle enforcement inside Eden; the deployment-level rule proven above is the same protection expressed at the protected server's process model.

Live boundary evidence — 2026-11-11 UTC (run gabriel-live, PHP lab)

Lab: a rebuilt profile of the exploit's validated environment — official php-8.5.11.tar.xz (SHA-256 d9be75c08e8c... verified at download), source build with the documented flags (-O2 -g -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fcf-protection=none), Ubuntu 26.04 Apache prefork + mod_php; this run's libphp.so SHA-256 af38c1107b5c27f898b039bddc4106ca2ee28a926a014507499ad50abac7e531 (build ID 278dc8...), not the exploit's validated binary ecd97e30.... Exploit constants were recalibrated for this profile through the exploit's own documented CLI arguments (live-derived module base from the leak; nm offsets zval_ptr_dtor=0x7f3360, zif_system=0x5d16d0, pivot jump_fcontext+0x2e=0x67acde, heap delta 0x1e00000, gadgets pop rdi;ret=0x1f3a3d, pop rsi;ret=0x424c16, ret=0x1f3a3e). Evidence: gabriel-2026-11-11/evidence/php2shell.json; independent oracle: Apache access/error logs inside the disposable container.

Executed results:

Boundary findings, stated exactly:

• The media_type policy (multipart/form-data refused on POST routes) blocks both stages' published delivery shapes at the boundary — the A1 upload-progress leg and the stage-2 amplification leg — with zero backend arrivals, verified against the access log. Causality is proven by the revoke arm.
• Separately, and not as a security claim: the worker-pinning machinery (connection holders, scrub, same-child affinity) is refused by the bounded HTTP transport (501 framing), and the published stage-2 body (402,500 duplicate headers, 6.1 MB) exceeds the gateway's bounded unary profile. Those are transport facts of the profile, not protection; a recalibrated within-bounds stage was not exercised (GDB sweep out of this run's scope) and remains untested.
• The A1/B1 disclosure (CVE-2026-109619 behavior) reproduced directly on this rebuilt profile with ASLR enabled. Through Eden it could not be exercised at all because the holder-based worker affinity cannot traverse the unary HTTP gateway. Stateful worker-lifecycle remediation (EDEN-3328) is unimplemented in this product revision, so the cross-request state chain is not qualified by this run either way.
• Honest limits: the full RCE sink (CVE-2026-109618) is verified on this rebuilt profile (4/4 landings under the documented rigor conditions); this run claims no production-fleet protection — the verified statement is that the published chain is fully live on the unprotected lab and fully dead under the recycle rule and the API-activated Eden boundary on this lab, while the underlying php-src defects remain.

Evidence appendix

• Tracking issue EDEN-3170
• Stateful remediation series EDEN-3328
• API freeze and portfolio contract EDEN-3160
• Skill references: api, testing

Decision flow

These are the recorded lab arms. MaxConnectionsPerChild counts connections; the diagram does not assert one request per worker under every keep-alive configuration.

Recorded Apache configuration snippets

The observed recycle-on arm used:

MaxConnectionsPerChild 1

The observed recycle-off control used:

MaxConnectionsPerChild 0

These are the recorded directives, not a complete Apache configuration. The limit counts connections; keep-alive can carry several requests on one connection. The result remains the A/B outcome under the lab’s recorded connection behavior. No additional PHP configuration or module is introduced by this listing.

Performance

The public evidence for this case does not include request-latency measurements.