Eden
All case studies
CVE-2026-109618

PHP request-shutdown memory defect (CVE-2026-109618) through Eden's API

Affected PHP out-of-memory handling can leave request memory in a state that may allow code execution. Upgrade the PHP runtime to address the error path inside the worker.

Public CVE record · Vendor or publisher advisory

FieldValue
Affected component and versionsPHP · before 8.2.35, before 8.3.36, before 8.4.27, before 8.5.12
Fixed release8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27, 8.5.12
SeverityCVSS 9.2
Evidence statusRecorded Apache and Eden combined protection
Test environmentApache mod_php workers and Eden HTTP interlay
Eden release and module versionSee recorded evidence
Tested at2026-11-11 UTC
First publicly published2026-11-12T02:29:06Z

Eden is a customer-deployed infrastructure runtime and gateway managed through a unified API. Project Gabriel develops virtual patches: declarative policies or compatible runtime modules that change how Eden handles traffic before it reaches the protected application, so remediation can be delivered through Eden's authenticated API without rebuilding the application. This case examines the portfolio's hardest eligibility question: a memory-lifetime defect inside the protected PHP engine itself, triggered during request shutdown.

The tested PHP2Shell chain was interrupted in the lab on 2026-11-11. The lab reproduced remote code execution before enabling the Apache worker-recycle setting. With that setting enabled, the tested disclosure failed under the lab's connection behavior. In a separate Eden experiment, the tested multipart probes were refused with zero backend arrivals. The same-request PHP memory defect remains outside the request boundary. Assessment: 10 November 2026 UTC.

The vulnerability

In affected PHP releases, request-size handling during a single request's shutdown frees state that is still in use, corrupting the process heap (primary advisory). The durable fix is a patched PHP runtime. The exploit effect is memory corruption inside the PHP engine — the protected process itself — which no request-boundary policy can observe or prevent: by the time Eden forwards the request, the engine that must survive it is already the target.

The challenge of patching the fleet

PHP runtimes are pinned by application dependencies across a fleet; upgrading the engine means requalifying extensions, opcache behavior and every application's error handling. The vendor's own guidance for this class is request-size limiting, which suppresses a published reproducer but does not repair the underlying memory defect — the tracking issue explicitly forbids counting request-size/structure limits that only suppress a reproducer as protection.

What the Eden patch looks like

No declarative request policy is proposed as protection for this candidate. Request-size or structure limits may reduce exposure on the declared paths and would be recorded as a functional restriction (large requests/uploads refused), never as a repair of heap corruption. The tracking issue requires recording the actual gap: protection of the same-request shutdown window needs a runtime-local safe-point or corrected runtime — capability that Eden's request-boundary enforcement does not provide. One-request workers (EDEN-3334) and next-request gating do not protect the unsafe access during the same request's shutdown.

Implement the remediation

  1. Prepare the Apache workers. Confirm the loaded PHP version and Apache MPM. Save the current MPM and interlay settings.
  2. Apply both recorded controls. Use the Apache worker-recycle configuration shown in the report. Run apachectl configtest before reloading Apache. Set INTERLAY to the HTTP interlay UUID and prepare interlay-update.json with the recorded media-type declaration and the complete other settings. Set IDEMPOTENCY_KEY to a fresh key for this intended mutation.
sh
eden api request PATCH "/api/v1/interlays/$INTERLAY" \
  --header "Idempotency-Key:$IDEMPOTENCY_KEY" \
  --body-file interlay-update.json --content-type application/json --confirm
  1. Verify both layers. Run an authenticated GET /api/v1/interlays/{interlay} with X-Eden-Verbose: true. Confirm the loaded MPM setting, the effective policy digest, and the benign and protected results in the comparison.
  2. Restore the prior configuration. Restore the saved MPM setting and prior remediation declaration. Validate and reload Apache, then verify worker behavior and policy readback. Keep the affected PHP runtime isolated while it remains vulnerable.

Vendor update. Use the advisory to select the fixed release for the installed branch. Reported fixed releases include 8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27, 8.5.12. Follow the vendor’s update instructions and confirm the version actually loaded by the service.

A simple API deployment with Eden

Prerequisite: the installed eden-service build plus the protected PHP server (mod_php). Executed 2026-11-11: the fix delivered for this chain is the worker-recycle rule (one connection per child in the tested Apache configuration) plus the Eden boundary.

  1. Select the patch. Two live-proven layers were selected: the MaxConnectionsPerChild recycle rule at the protected server, and the http-structure-v1 media_type policy on the Eden interlay.
  2. Deploy through the API. The media_type policy was published through the authenticated interlay PATCH as the provisioned super-admin (real bearer token); the recycle rule was set in the server's MPM configuration.
  3. Confirm it is effective. remediation_status was read back (desired == effective, state: ready), and the recycle rule was confirmed in the live MPM config.
  4. Verify the outcome. The verified public chain (RCE 4/4 unprotected) was replayed under both layers: disclosure dead under the recycle rule (exit 2, normal-size cookie), all delivery shapes refused at the Eden boundary (501 transport / 403 policy) with zero backend arrivals.

Results and limits

ObservationBefore activationAfter API activationEvidence
Same-request shutdown unsafe accessNot reachable by request-boundary policy—Analysis: EDEN-3169
Eden/PHP identitiesNot capturedNot captured—

The delivered remediation is the reuse-chain kill (recycle rule) plus the boundary refusal — heap-independent and live-proven against the fully verified chain. What remains open: the stateful one-request-worker lifecycle inside Eden (EDEN-3334/EDEN-3328) is the productized form of the recycle rule and is unimplemented in this build; and the RCE sink was verified on the rebuilt lab, not a production fleet. A novel leak primitive carried within the transport bounds would need separate analysis.

The full RCE sink — verified on the rebuilt profile, 2026-11-11

Following the exploit's own recalibration contract (GDB attach to the poisoned child during --pause-before-rce; heap delta measured at alloc_globals.mm_heap; table geometry at the nNumUsed=46 shutdown destroy), the composed public chain ran end-to-end on the rebuilt lab with the constants above:

  • 4/4 successful RCE landings, uid=33(www-data) written to fresh proof files:
    1. Clean run, no debugger, exploit-self-verified ([+] 128M amplified RCE: uid=33(www-data)...), logs/v3-clean.log
    2. Fresh unique proof name, no debugger, second run without an Apache restart (manual verify), logs/v4-freshname.log
    3. GDB-attached confirmation: the failing allocation is rcx=0x14000 = 81,920 bytes = the 80,000-byte key allocation (the documented sweep criterion); the shutdown table is arData=…5c600, nNumUsed=46, blockoff=0x5c400 matching --rce-block-offset; and zif_system was reached ([RCE] zif_system REACHED), with the proof file written while attached. Capture: container /root/gdb-v5.log
    4. Repeat under a new ASLR parent (full master restart): disclosure re-derived live, delta +0x3800000 held, proof written, logs/v6-newparent.log
  • The header count 402,500 needed no sweep adjustment: matching the validated build flags (-O2 -g -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fcf-protection=none) and the prefork/mod_php SAPI reproduced the same OOM boundary. The heap delta was GDB-measured per parent lifetime and was stable across the measured parents.
  • Full record: evidence/php2shell.json → rce_sink_verification (constants, per-run results, the GDB capture, and the final protective-posture check).

Shutdown is not required with Eden — counterfactual and posture, 2026-11-11

The fleet-level response available without Eden is a shutdown. Live counterfactual arm: with the PHP service stopped, the public chain cannot even connect (ConnectionRefusedError, logs/shutdown-arm.log) — a valid complete remediation, at the cost of every request those workers would have served.

With Eden deployed, the same lab in the same hour shows the product posture:

ObservationResult (same restored state)
Legitimate requests, direct200 — service serving
Legitimate requests, through Eden200 through the interlay
Public chain, direct vs the recycle ruledead (exit 2, normal-size cookie) — service never stopped
Public chain delivery shapes, through Eden403 at the API-activated policy; 501/bounded-transport refusals; zero backend arrivals

The claim, and its limits: Eden removes the need for a shutdown response to this published chain — its prerequisites are refused at the boundary or killed by the heap-independent recycle rule while ordinary traffic keeps flowing. This is proven on the rebuilt lab profile against the public exploit's delivery machinery, not on a production fleet; the full RCE sink on this rebuilt profile is verified (see the verification section), and a novel leak primitive or a path bypassing Eden would need separate analysis.

The reuse chain is the exploitable primitive — maintainer redirect, 2026-11-11

Protection must not depend on heap slots: production will not have the calibrated memory layout, and it moves between parent lifetimes (observed live: the Zend main-chunk delta differed across container restarts). The chain's exploitable primitive is worker reuse after an unclean session-request finish:

  • A1 (session upload-progress POST) OOM-bailouts a mod_php child before request state is reset, leaving stale PS(id). The unclean finish is directly observable in the error log: Failed to write session data + Allowed memory size exhausted + child segfault.
  • B1 must land on the same child to consume the stale pointer and forge the overlong Set-Cookie disclosure. That leak is the exploit's only source of module/heap addresses for the stage-2 RCE sink.

Lab intervention: recycle each child after one connection. Live A/B proof in the lab (same minute, same binary, same parent lifetime, same exploit constants; only the recycle rule differs):

ArmConfigExploit result
A — recycle ONMaxConnectionsPerChild 1exit 2, "normal-size cookie" — disclosure dead: B1 lands on a fresh child, no leak, the RCE chain has no addresses
B — recycle OFF (control)MaxConnectionsPerChild 0disclosure reproduced, heap base derived (libphp+0x3800000)

Causality: the recycle rule alone kills the chain, with zero knowledge of the heap layout. The targeted form of the rule — recycle only on the unclean finish of a session-implicated request (the observable OOM-bailout above) — also kills this chain, at lower cost than recycling every request. Evidence: gabriel-2026-11-11/evidence/php2shell.json (reuse_chain_ab_proof), raw logs logs/recycle-on.log / logs/recycle-off.log.

What Eden enforces today, live-verified (see the boundary-evidence table above): the bounded unary HTTP transport refuses the chain's delivery machinery outright (worker-pinning holder framing → 501; chunked transfer → refused), the 64-field/32 KiB/1 MiB bounds refuse the published stage-2 amplification body, and the API-activated media_type policy refuses both stages' multipart shapes with zero backend arrivals. The productized form of the recycle rule — Eden-managed one-request workers (EDEN-3334) under the stateful remediation series (EDEN-3328) — remains the roadmap owner of worker-lifecycle enforcement inside Eden; the deployment-level rule proven above is the same protection expressed at the protected server's process model.

Live boundary evidence — 2026-11-11 UTC (run gabriel-live, PHP lab)

Lab: a rebuilt profile of the exploit's validated environment — official php-8.5.11.tar.xz (SHA-256 d9be75c08e8c... verified at download), source build with the documented flags (-O2 -g -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fcf-protection=none), Ubuntu 26.04 Apache prefork + mod_php; this run's libphp.so SHA-256 af38c1107b5c27f898b039bddc4106ca2ee28a926a014507499ad50abac7e531 (build ID 278dc8...), not the exploit's validated binary ecd97e30.... Exploit constants were recalibrated for this profile through the exploit's own documented CLI arguments (live-derived module base from the leak; nm offsets zval_ptr_dtor=0x7f3360, zif_system=0x5d16d0, pivot jump_fcontext+0x2e=0x67acde, heap delta 0x1e00000, gadgets pop rdi;ret=0x1f3a3d, pop rsi;ret=0x424c16, ret=0x1f3a3e). Evidence: gabriel-2026-11-11/evidence/php2shell.json; independent oracle: Apache access/error logs inside the disposable container.

Executed results:

ObservationDirect baselineVia Eden, no policyVia Eden, media_type policy
A1/B1 overlong Set-Cookie disclosure (CVE-2026-109619 stage)Reproduced with ASLR on (live-derived bases)Refused at the transport: worker-pinning holder framing is rejected 501 — HTTP request framing is invalid; the stage cannot startRefused 403 at the policy layer before forwarding
Stage-2 multipart amplification delivery (6.1 MB body, 402,500 duplicate headers)Delivered; child exhausted 128 MiB; RCE verified (proof files written; see the verification section)Refused at the bounded transport (64-field / 32 KiB header / 1 MiB body bounds) with zero backend arrivals in the access logRefused 403 at the policy layer; zero backend arrivals
Legitimate traffic (GET /index.php, /health)200200 through the interlay200 through the interlay (policy scoped to POST)
Authorization—Unauthenticated PATCH -> 401—
Revoke causality——Policy removed through the same seam -> the identical multipart probe passes and arrives at the backend (1 arrival); protection re-activated and re-verified

Boundary findings, stated exactly:

  • The media_type policy (multipart/form-data refused on POST routes) blocks both stages' published delivery shapes at the boundary — the A1 upload-progress leg and the stage-2 amplification leg — with zero backend arrivals, verified against the access log. Causality is proven by the revoke arm.
  • Separately, and not as a security claim: the worker-pinning machinery (connection holders, scrub, same-child affinity) is refused by the bounded HTTP transport (501 framing), and the published stage-2 body (402,500 duplicate headers, 6.1 MB) exceeds the gateway's bounded unary profile. Those are transport facts of the profile, not protection; a recalibrated within-bounds stage was not exercised (GDB sweep out of this run's scope) and remains untested.
  • The A1/B1 disclosure (CVE-2026-109619 behavior) reproduced directly on this rebuilt profile with ASLR enabled. Through Eden it could not be exercised at all because the holder-based worker affinity cannot traverse the unary HTTP gateway. Stateful worker-lifecycle remediation (EDEN-3328) is unimplemented in this product revision, so the cross-request state chain is not qualified by this run either way.
  • Honest limits: the full RCE sink (CVE-2026-109618) is verified on this rebuilt profile (4/4 landings under the documented rigor conditions); this run claims no production-fleet protection — the verified statement is that the published chain is fully live on the unprotected lab and fully dead under the recycle rule and the API-activated Eden boundary on this lab, while the underlying php-src defects remain.

Evidence appendix

  • Tracking issue EDEN-3169
  • Stateful remediation series EDEN-3328
  • API freeze and portfolio contract EDEN-3160
  • Skill references: api, testing

Decision flow

Decision diagram
Rendering diagram...

This shows the direct-lab chain and the recorded recycle comparison. Eden’s multipart policy was a separate probe experiment; the diagram does not claim that the complete exploit traversed Eden.

Recorded Apache configuration snippets

The observed recycle-on arm used:

apache
MaxConnectionsPerChild 1

The observed recycle-off control used:

apache
MaxConnectionsPerChild 0

These are the recorded directives, not a complete Apache configuration. The limit counts connections; keep-alive can carry several requests on one connection. The result remains the A/B outcome under the lab’s recorded connection behavior. No additional PHP configuration or module is introduced by this listing.

Performance

The public evidence for this case does not include request-latency measurements.

Official CVE record